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Relativism, Neutrality, and Transcendentalism: Beyond
Autonomy
Bobby Jindar
The promotion of human well-being is the function which accords just
societies legitimacy. Thus, different political theorists transform benign
assumptions, seemingly truisms, abouthuman welfare into startling conclusions by
focusing on particular aspects of human flourishing. For example, Rawls turns
equality into an absolute concern for the least advantaged; Dworkin starts with
people's preferences and concludes with elaborate social welfare programs; Nozick
goes from self-ownership to inviolable property rights, etc.' A theorist's
conception of human well-being, the good, determines the shape of his just society.
All conceptions of the good invoke transcendental assumptions; any
justification for acting in a non-random manner involves non-derivable morality.
Political disputes are not always mere matters of partisanship, but rather often
involve transcendental ideals; whether one appeals to justice, love, value of human
life, etc., one is appealing to a common belief in some abstract principle of good.
Even the nihilist must acknowledge some higher good, even if only the truth of his
perspective. Ethics, the study of how society and the individual promote
fundamental goods, is thus the core of a political conception of justice. However,
communitarianism, which enshrines societal preferences and traditions as morality,
incorrectly reduces ethics to the study of sociology; liberalism, as expressed by
Rawls' neutrality, does not even consider ethics relevant to the notion of justice.
Neither properly considers the realm of ethics in formulating principles of justice.
The liberal goal of neutrality, which makes autonomy man's most crucial and
defining right, is misguided and forces man to be hostage to his most base instincts,
with no hope to rise above himself and no appeal to external standards. The
communitarian goal of multiculturalism merely moves the focus from man to
society, claiming autonomy as a group, rather than individual, right. Plato
recognizes the danger of the relativists' perspective that morality is nothing more
than individual preferences or societal convention; he rightfully criticizes them for
being obsessed with the superficial accidents, as opposed to essences, of the world,
unable to abstract from their particular experiences to universal truth claims.'
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Liberals and communitarians both regard their lack of transcendental truth
claims as an attractive aspect of their theories. Communitarians accept each
society's shared values as the right conception of the good for that community,
and liberals, at least those committed to neutrality, avoid commenting on a
comprehensive conception of the good. Yet, neither group truly avoids making
transcendental claims; their pretense unfairly prevents others from commenting
on their ideals.
I. LIBERAL NEUTRALrrY
Modem liberals accomplish much towards illustrating the intuitive appeal of
treating all individuals with respect. Both Rawls and Dworkin have devised
models which force one to consider the well-being of others. Their egalitarian-
ism "rests on the assumption of a natural right of all men and women to equality
of concern and respect, a right they possess... simply as human beings."3 Yet,
both theorists fail to build on this bold assertion and instead retreat by defining
this right in terms of self-determination rather than objective interests; the result
is a liberal neutrality towards conceptions of the good life4
Rawls attempts to avoid commenting on controversial moral truths, specific
conceptions of the good, due to a commitment to public consensus; thus, he
requires individuals to set aside their comprehensive notions of the good in the
political sphere to facilitate agreement. Rawls formulates his principles of justice
as a codification of people's rational, or universalizable, self-interest, rather than
their particular self-interests. Rawls does not intend to* posit any significant
beliefs through this Kantian abstraction, but rather to help individuals discern and
develop what they already believe;' however, his is but one of many competing
models which guarantee impartiality, e.g., utilitarianism, and thus requires
specific justification,6 rather than being a neutral starting position from which
other theories must justify their departure.
Rawls interprets consensus as requiring a commitment to promoting diversity
and thus allows individuals the liberties and resources to "question and reject any
particular relationship."' People must be free to examine humanity's collective
experience, not merely what others have chosen for them, and select what is
relevant to their lives.$ Without the right to question the norms of birth,
3. Ronald Dworkin, The Original Position, in Reading Rawls 51 (Norman Daniels ed., 1975).
4. Dworkin, supra note 1, at 191-92.
5. John Rawls. Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical. 14 Phil. & Pub. Aft. 236-39
(1985) [hereinafter Justice as Fairness); John Rawls, A Kantian Conception of Equality, in Readings
in Social and Political Philosophy 193-94 (Robert M. Stewart ed., 1975).
6. Thomas Nagel, Equality, in Readings in Social and Political Philosophy 265 (Robert M.
Stewart ed.. 1986); Thomas Scanlon, Liberty, Contract, and Contribution, in Markets and Morals 51-
52 (Gerald Dworldn et al. eds., 1977).
7. Will Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Philosophy 207 (1990).
8. John Stuart Mill, On Liberty and Utilitarianism 56 (1992).
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communities would be deprived of the experiences of others based on geography;
man would be condemned to reinventing the wheel in every locale. It is
exposure to outside influences that leads individuals to abandon the parochial
attitude that produces racism and other forms of intolerant isolation.
Communitarians and others object that this liberal commitment to the right
to change one's conception of the good is itself a controversial conception of the
good, not a rationality which transcends cultural influences. Though Rawls
happily concedes that his theory draws upon beliefs latent in democratic
societies, he denies that positing the common aim of justice is the same as
advancing a particular conception of the good. 9 However, Rawls must presume
those institutional arrangements necessary to support his conception. A
completely neutral liberalism is unable to encourage autonomy or other capacities
necessary for exercising choice; liberal values require communal structures like
universities to thrive. Rawls himself promotes certain virtues, e.g., toleration and
trust, necessary for a liberal state, this follows from the observation that such
virtues are necessary for a well-ordered political society which is needed to
secure common goods which are not available to the individual.'0 Yet, liberal
goods such as education must be justified either as communitarian, formulated
in a cultural context, or as serving an objective interest, e.g., promoting
knowledge for the sake of learning.
Liberal theorists respond differently to the the claim that their theories
contain particular conceptions of the good. Richard Rorty acknowledges that
Rawls does not provide an independent reason for justice, but rather articulates
liberal intuitions. Rorty thus denies the value of neutrality and sees no reason
to separate liberal democratic institutions from their particular historical context.
He goes so far as to attack theorists living in a particular culture who reject the
basic principles of that same culture." Rawls himself claims his conception of
justice is particular to those readers who share his membership in a liberal
constitutional democracy and thus also share significant political traditions."
In contrast, Dworkin argues that the principles embedded in the original
position may be "constitutive of [man's] moral capacity," rather than merely
being widely shared within a particular community.'3 Instead of appealing to
and depending upon assumptions people already hold concerning justice, Rawls
may be advancing principles which include "innate categories of morality
common to all men, imprinted in their neural structure, so that man could not
deny these principles short of abandoning the power to reason about morality at
9. John Rawls, The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus, 7 Oxford J. Legal Stud. 1, 10 (1987).
10. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 5-6. 147-49 (David Ross ed., rev. by J.L. Ackrill & J.O.
Urmson, Oxford Univ. Press 1980); Stephen Mulhall & Adam Swift, Liberals & Communitarians
125, 212, 217-18 (1992).
11. Richard Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth 187-89 (1991).
12. Rawls, Justice as Fairness, supra note 5, at 234,
13. Dworkin. supra note 3, at 26.
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all."'4 Dworkin is certainly not advocating complete abstraction from societal
influence. He readily admits that liberals start with foundational values, i.e.,
liberty, equality, and community, but claims these assumptions are substantially
different and far more valuable than other social values, e.g., attitudes concerning
sexual preference, adopted by communitarians. Dworkin claims social agreement
on justice, but not values like sexual preference, is a necessary component of
leading the good life; social justice is a collective good necessary for individual
flourishing, but obtainable only by society.
These two contrasting approaches to liberal notions of justice, considering
them coincidental to society or with inherent value, reflect opposing perspectives
on the value of neutrality. Rawls views his neutrality regarding the good as a
positive aspect of his theory which responds to the fact that reasonable
individuals disagree about the good." If Rawls is merely making an empirical
claim about pluralism, his neutralism evaporates once society agrees on a
conception of the good, e.g., fundamentalist Muslim countries, or at least on a
thicker conception than his. On the other hand, if Rawls is advocating pluralism
as a goal for society, then he is advancing a comprehensive notion of the good
which cannot claim neutrality. 6  The latter tactic, adopted by Rorty, is
considered below in the section on communitarianism; the acceptance of
neutrality is discussed here.
Ignoring Rawls' later writings limiting his theory of justice to a particular
community allows one to analyze his claims of universalizability and neutrality.
Rawls denies communities the right to be unified on any "comprehensive religious,
philosophical, or moral doctrine."' 7 Yet, a commitment to liberal neutrality is
self-defeating since its denial of the necessity of a first principle is itself a particular
conception of the good. Unlike those who oppose an overly zealous perfectionist
state because of the possibility of error or civil strife,'$ Rawls rejects any degree
of perfectionism on principle and thus seemingly believes one of the following:
1. a true conception of the good does not exist
2. the true conception is completely unintelligible to man
3. diversity and popular support are more important than truth.
Any one of these three beliefs represents a thicker conception of the good than is
suggested by neutrality. The significance of these positions is evidenced by
contrasting conceptions of the good; surely, a liberal would have difficulty
convincing a religious fundamentalist that divine revelation is either fraudulent,
illusory, or irrelevant.
14. Id.
15. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 433 (1971).
16. Muthall and Swift, supra note 10. at 223-25.
17. John Rawls, The Priority of Right and Ideas of the Good, 17 Phil. & Pub. AfM. 251. 269
(1988).
18. Joseph Raz. The Morality of Freedom 412, 418-19, 427, 429 (1986).
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Rawls' conflation of self-determination with the good leads to a subjectivism
which is hardly neutral. Though he explicitly rejects moral relativism, Rawls
views the changing of conceptions of the good as nothing more than a change
in preferences. Rawls' description of an individual choosing his ends does not
allow one to discover inherent ends which form integral aspects of one's identity,
to rise above desires through self-reflection.'
9
Both past liberal and contemporary communitarian theorists reject Rawls'
equation of the good with individual desires. For example, Hobbes argues that
nature forces man to adopt an objective concept of good and evil, transcending
subjectivity to derive universal precepts.' Going even further than Hobbes'
dictates, Charles Taylor posits the existence and necessity of a moral space, a
religious or political framework which serves as a context for man's preferences,
independent of man's ability to find himself within it.2 As the necessity of
such a perspective is "constitutive" of humanity and not merely an empirical
psychological fact, Taylor agrees with Alisdair Maclntyre in claiming that
morality makes sense only with respect to objective ends; both theorists claim
the function of morality is to allow man to move towards those goals inherent
in his nature."
Despite his rhetoric about neutrality, Rawls makes significant assumptions
about human well-being; for example, he uses "reasonable constraints" to order
the original principle, in which rational choice is exercised and primary goods
are assumed necessary for human well-being. Reasonable constraints, rational
choice, and primary goods all constitute a conception of the good.23 Though
the two transcendental assumptions which underlie Rawls' theory, i.e., rationality
and human well-being, are not critiqued for being mistaken, they cannot be
assumed as self-evident. Such particular notions demand particular justifications
or, at least, an explicit acknowledgement of their content and significance.
A. Rationality
The first of two significant assumptions made by liberal theorists is the
power of rationality. All theorists use at least procedural rationality, supposedly
devoid of moral or political content, without questioning its source and
credibility. As all beliefs must either be grounded in a rational framework or
accepted on faith, liberals choose the former, since the latter allows the fanatic
who knows he is right regardless of evidence to the contrary. There is no
arguing with principles held on faith, and thus the more reasonable, and thus
19. John Rawls, Fairness to Goodness, 84 Phil. Rev. 536. 537 (1975); Rawls, supra note 15.
at 417.
20. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan 183-88, 205-06, 214-17 (C.B. Macpherson ed.. 1985).
21. Alisdair Macintyre, After Virtue 140 (1981); Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self 27-29, 34-
36 (1989).
22. Maclntyre, supra note 21, at 140; Taylor, supra note 21, at 27-29, 34-36.
23. Mulhall and Swift, supra note 10, at 211, 216-17.
1997] 1257
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
neutral, alternative of rationality is usually advanced in defense of political
theories. However, this disingenuous move of claiming the transparency of
rational thought contains very significant assumptions, i.e., involves a degree of
faith.
The universality of reason allows individuals to interact and thus move from
their subjective experiences to interpersonal communication. Indeed, it does not
seem possible to overstate the power and indispensability of reason; it is no
wonder that people commonly use reason without questioning it or its origin. If
reason did not exist, society would have to make it up; yet, it is impossible to
conceive of the creation of reason without invoking it.
Kant argues that reason serves as the, criterion by which one judges
experience, and is thus the basis of all moral concepts." One can take another
step back and realize that the basic principles of logic cannot be accepted without
reference to some a priori criteria. For example, treating like cases alike, laws
of inference, the principle of economy, and other basic building blocks of logic
can be accepted only on faith and are not self-evident. Imagine trying to
convince one who does not believe in reason without resorting to reason itself;
logic does the work behind all proofs.
While reason, e.g., the laws of causation, is almost universally accepted, the
only supporting evidence seems to be experience, and perhaps probabilities. the
same criteria rejected by Kant as an insufficient foundation. The fact that event
Y occurs immediately after event X in every occurrence may be coincidence.
Perhaps in the billionth instance, X and not Y will be observed. Man observes
and then formulates general principles. For example, biologists observe patterns
in genetic materials that produce proteins that result in characteristics like eye
color; they then conclude that the genes cause the characteristics. In reality, the
scientist only knows that genes coincide with phenotype patterns; their assumed
causal relationship may be no more valid than a child's belief that his toy
steering wheel causes the family car to turn. Humans are incapable of proving
with absolute certainty even the simplest causal relationship. It is always
possible that some unseen force is at work, further observations will prove an
unstable relationship between supposed cause and effect, the laws of deduction
are mistaken, etc.
Natural laws, which allow man to assume an ordered and predictable world,
reflect past observations and are thus descriptions of reality based on laws of
logic accepted on faith. This conditional view of reality suggests more
acceptance for the exceptional and seemingly irrational claim, currently labelled
miracle by proponent and nonsense by skeptic, as an improbable but possible
event. If natural laws are based on experience, then any exceptional observation
has diminished but not insignificant grounds for acceptance. If a series of
observations are irreconcilable, it is the principle of rationality and not the
24. Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals 78-79 (H.J. Paton trans., Harper
Torchbooks 1964).
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observations which must be reexamined. Perhaps rationality and natural laws are
merely the most probable explanation of events and circumstances, likely but not
absolutely true.
Much evidence suggests that reality may be governed by rules of probability
rather than absolute physical laws: the Uncertainty Principle, which claims that
one cannot know both the momentum and the position of electrons, and the
resulting electron clouds, or wave-like distributions, which represent the probable
location of particle-like objects; the fact that apparently solid objects are actually
non-continuous and composed of atoms with gaps and spaces between and within
them; and quantum physics. However, the rules of probability are no more self-
evident than the rules of rationality and must themselves be accepted by some
criteria.
Expecting future events to coincide with expectations based on past
observations involves a leap of faith. For example, there is no absolute reason
to believe that removing one's sock will reveal a foot, rather than a tomato, or
to trust one's visual perception that a foot is revealed. Not even relative
properties can be predicted, e.g., that which looks and smells like vinegar will
have a bitter taste, as there is no basis for a relationship to persist through time.
Given the lack of an independent reason to believe in rationality as a means
to understand an ordered world, human observations are subject to skepticism.
There is no apparent reason to believe that the human mind is capable of
anything more than subjective perceptions and random reaction to external
stimuli. Indeed, future forms of virtual reality may render the human brain
incapable of discerning which images reflect reality. Relativism applied to an
individual's senses and thought processes leaves him incapable of making sense
of the external world in a manner which makes sense to others.
Even if the individual's perceptions are left intact, there is no independent
reason to expect an objective external world. Many a child wonders about the
existence of objects not directly affecting himself; such questions may not be
easily dismissed. How does one know that others continue to exist once they
.cease interacting with the subject? How can one even know that he exists and
is not merely a part of another's imagination? Such questions demand the
existence of something larger than oneself to give meaning and substance to
reality, life, and thoughts. Indeed, Descartes, author of the statement "I think,
therefore I am," used this necessity to argue for the existence of God."
However, even Descartes assumed much in insisting that his consciousness
established the veracity of his existence.
Perhaps the patterning of human responses or external images are neither
completely random nor governed by absolute rules, but are subject to periodic
and unexplainable fluctuations. Entropy counters the common assumption that
the world must be an ordered place. Without a transcendental basis for accepting
rationality as a means of discerning reality, it is entirely possible, and perhaps
25. Jack Taylor, The Modernist Persona, This Rock 25-26 (Nov. 1996).
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even likely, that brief interruptions of the ordering of the world are common-
place. Thus, rather than total chaos, which would be a rule unto itself, the world
follows no predictable rules. The intermix of chaos and rule may be so random
as to make it impossible to discern whether Elvis sightings, UFOs landing in the
middle of the night, and the laws governing the behavior of gases are more or
less credible. The individual has no reason to appeal to rationality to judge his
or others' experiences; the world is rendered inaccessible to man's thought
processes.
The lack of an independent justification for rationality, which calls into
question the ability of man to perceive reality, jeopardizes the projects of
theorists who use reason to make conclusions about man's moral obligations to
his fellow citizens. Such metaphysical and epistemological questions have been
the center of many philosophical debates throughout the centuries. Traditional
Western thought, grounded in a Judeo-Christian context best articulated by St.
Thomas Aquinas,' accepts rationality and a natural order based on divine
revelation. Such an ordering is stronger than rationality based on observation
alone, but is still contingent. Descartes' postulate may be rephrased as: "God
exists and has revealed to me; therefore I am"; instead of going from the
individual to God, one goes from God to oneself. In contrast with Kant's claim
that reason is necessary to comprehend God's revelation, God's revelation may
be necessary to comprehend reason; God must, therefore, communicate to man
via intuition, or other mystical channels, and then legitimize man's intellect.
The presumption of an ordered world accessible to man, in an otherwise
chaotic system, requires an assumption as significant as belief in a purposeful
Creator. The original creation of matter, life, and order seemingly defies the
laws of entropy and conservation of matter and energy. Therefore, Western
philosophers have traditionally accepted both the natural order and a limited
number of miracles, supernatural events like creation itself, to explain reality.
The alternatives, either a blind faith in reason to explain even creation and to
justify itself or the complete abandonment of reason, would render natural laws
either a deity or useless. Given the contingency of rationality, the world would
be a chaotic and unintelligible place without such basic assumptions.
A world governed by natural laws and accessible to man via reason may be
contrasted with certain Eastern perspectives, e.g., Buddhism, which ground
eternal truths on a plane which transcends physical reality and discern these
truths through contemplative meditation rather than analytical thought. For Hindi
philosophers and others in this context, physical reality is only relevant insofar
as it contains an indirect relationship with the spiritual world. Hindus do not
predicate their beliefs on any historical or objective incident, person, or truth.
Hinduism is a completely transcendental religion concerned with inner
sanctification rather than external teachings.
26. The assumptions discussed are common to the traditions of Moslem, Jewish, and Christian
faiths.
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The Eastern detachment from and deemphasis on the physical world is
evidenced by the lack of importance Hindus place on material circumstances; one
soul has many bodily forms, and nirvana involves a complete detachment from
one's body to be joined with other souls. This is in sharp contrast with
Christianity which links the spiritual and physical worlds and is based on a
specific event. The contrast in perspectives is what produces such divergent
conclusions such as sacramental theology, which elevates the physical to the
supernatural, and nirvana, which uses and then escapes from the physical to
achieve the supernatural.
The contrast between Western and Eastern perspectives is not meant to
suggest that rationality is an exclusive product of the West. However, Hinduism
and Buddhism are both more concerned with inner realization, rather than
external reality, through meditation, rather than thought. Abstracting from one's
identity, and even mind, to engage in epiphanies is the Hindi and Buddhist path
to ultimate knowledge. Though Easterners utilize reason to resolve mundane
problems such as managing an economy and preparing a meal, the deeper
questions considered in political philosophy, e.g., the notion of individuality and
extent of obligations to others, are answered using meditation.
The provision of justification for rationality through a Judeo-Christian
context does not preclude other paths to reach the same conclusion. For
example, a pragmatist may accept rationality due to its common acceptability and
utility. Secular humanists may deify the individual's potential for enlightenment
and progress through the use of intellect to overcome his limitations. Yet, such
"ends justify the means" approaches that accept rationality based on its
consequences rather than the process itself make no ontological claims and
hardly suggest an overpowering incentive to choose reason when facing
conflicting internal motivators. Reason is but one of many forces which an
individual may choose to decide his course of action; emotion, subjective
preferences, and arbitrariness must be overcome. Indeed, certain feminists reject
linear logic as a male:centered approach to the world.
The Aquinas view of reason, which provides a powerful, but not always
successful, argument for choosing reason over emotivism or other competing
perspectives, makes reason dependent on the credibility of its source. If one
accepts reason based on revelation, one is seemingly obligated to accept other
revelations from the same source. This restriction and its unconventionality are
perhaps why most theorists accept rationality without questioning its source.
However, the most rational act may be to accept that which is beyond reason as
evidence for reason itself. Why theorists believe is as important as what they
believe.
Rawls, Dworkin, and other liberals are definitely grounded in the Western
tradition and accept rationality, the importance of the physical world, free will,
and other principles historically accepted on religious faith as transcendental
principles prior to chosen beliefs. Indeed, such principles are used to discern
society's good; Rawls assumes individuals are motivated by self-interest
expressed rationally in the original position. Yet, Rawls does not justify
1997] 1261
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excluding one's religious convictions, and other sources of "bias," to form the
veil of ignorance, while maintaining rationality; indeed, talking meaningfully
about justice involves cultural values embedded in language. The very
experiences and natural characteristics which he ignores are essential in
motivating individuals to be rational. Though the disembodied selves present in
the original position, devoid of any particular characteristics and preferences,
resemble the Eastern notion of the physical world, Rawls relies on Western
rationality.
Even more significant than Rawls' use of rationality within the original
position is his reliance on a particular conception of the good to design the
original position. While reason may inform Rawls of the desirability of a
progressive income tax, given his desire to assist the least advantaged, reason
cannot provide the initial impulse towards equality. Procedural reason informs
man of how best to achieve his goals, but does not provide those goals. Reason
helps man choose among courses of action only by referencing previously held
beliefs; a particular conception of the good, not reason, motivates man to act.
Thus, each theory's conception of the good provides rationality with the premise
it needs to make conclusions. Liberals depend upon their view of human well-
being to do the work in their theories, i.e., provide reason with the good to be
maximized.
B. Human Well-Being
Liberal theories depend on particular notions of humanity and its welfare for
their moral force. Regardless of whether the original position is presented as
proof or illustration, Rawls posits his interpretation of human well-being as the
proper criteria by which to judge society." Without defending their particular
interpretations of the right to equal respect, both Rawls and Dworkin claim "the
right is 'owed to human beings as moral persons' and follows from the moral
personality that distinguishes humans from animals." 28 Thus, Rawls' expression
of the liberal good of equality is a transcendental moral principle which precedes
his original position.
Dworkin, at least, claims his goal of equality as both the result of people's
preferences and also an objective good. He claims, as an obviously established
political tradition, "principles are fair if they have ... been chosen by those
whom they govern, or if they [are] in their antecedent common interest."29
Like Rawls, Dworkin is loath to commit himself to a universal theory; unlike
Rawls, Dworkin is more willing to admit that his notion of human well-being is
objectively valuable. Dworkin resolves this tension between his desire for
27. Rawls, Distributive Justice, supra note 1, at 203-05, 209; Rawls, A Kantian Conception of
Equality, supra note I, at 188, 290, 192.
28. Dworkin. supra note 3, at 50-51.
29. Id. at 24.
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tolerance and an objective good by expecting people's preferences to coincide
with his good. He offers no independent argument for his notion of human well-
being, but rather hopes his notion resonates with his audience's beliefs; Dworkin
has nothing to say to fundamentalists and others with no regard for liberal ideals.
Liberals are not alone in presuming a transcendental good; however, they are
particularly vulnerable to the charge of hypocrisy to the extent they claim
neutrality. As liberal theorists argue from particular conceptions of the good,
involving transcendental assumptions, they should justify their starting points or
at least make clear the significance of their first principles. The liberal claim to
neutrality, used to critique other theories which adopt fuller conceptions of the
good, renders liberals guilty of assuming the better part of their conclusions
without warning their readers.
The significance of liberal assumptions concerning human well-being is
highlighted when contrasted with Eastern notions of the good. The liberal
concern for the material welfare of each individual represents a particular
approach to morality. Similar to the way in which Aquinas accepted logic
through divine revelation, Western thinkers have accepted this view of the good
based on the thought that people are made in God's image and are commanded
to love each other.30
The conception of human worth common to the Judeo-Christian and Islamic
traditions is historically and philosophically tied to man's unique possession of
a soul. Other traditions, like Hinduism, reject any substantive moral difference
between human and animal life; the doctrine of reincarnation, when linked with
the incorporation of souls into animal forms and the resulting Jainist prohibition
against killing animals, denies any morally relevant feature which provides man
with unique rights. Traditions which deny man's unique moral worth often deny
personal identity and exhibit little concern for man's material welfare, two
notions which underlie the liberal view of human dignity.
Liberalism's endowment of the individual with agency and independent
value is inconsistent with a collective view of identity. For example, Buddhism
encourages one to overcome desire and to realize there is no self. Whereas
Christianity encourages the individual to discipline his ego, Buddhism denies the
existence of the ego. Thus, the Buddhist ideal is to transcend, perhaps eliminate,
the self and be released from suffering and even joy. Similarly, the Hindu's goal
is to achieve nirvana, union with the Creator, and thus lose individuality, this
goal is gradually achieved through reincarnations. Whereas Buddhists recognize
no identity, Hindus recognize one collective identity; this is in contrast with the
Christian perspective which invests each human with a unique identity.
Liberalism's adoption of the promotion of human flourishing as society's
goal is contrary to a view which condones physical suffering. For example,
certain Hindi scholars discourage acts of charity towards the less fortunate in
30. Henry J. Hyde. Keeping God In the Closet: The "Religion-And-Politics" Debate 6-7
(1985).
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order to allow them to suffer for the mistakes of past lives and progress towards
nirvana; the charitable act is to allow the impoverished to endure this life's
punishments to secure a greater reward in the next one. Physical suffering may
be efficacious at producing longer-lasting and more valuable spiritual benefits,
a teaching partially adopted by the Catholic Church and evidenced by its
doctrines concerning purgatory, euthanasia, atonement, fasting, Lent, etc.
Though liberals present their notion of the good as self-evident, history
testifies to the particularity of equating autonomy rights and physical well-being
with human flourishing. The liberal good of autonomy has not been accorded
primacy throughout much of Western civilization's history, as evidenced by
feudalism, aristocracy, divinely appointed monarchies, etc., and is still not the
most valuable good in many Eastern countries.3' For example, Calvin and his
followers denied the priority of liberty over a particular conception of the good
and defined human well-being in spiritual, rather than material, terms; his
administration imprisoned a lady for dancing, forced a man to eat nothing but
bread and water for criticizing a sermon, burned another for denying the Trinity,
etc. 32 Lest one thinks Calvin's perspective represents an unenlightened age,
irrelevant to modern man, it is useful to note that certain adherents of the Islamic
faith practice conversion by the sword and view the state's purpose as the
promotion of "a good Muslim life."33 Yet, it is not only fundamentalists who
reject the liberal notion of the good. Mainstream religions of both the East and
West view spiritual goods as necessary for human flourishing; liberal neutrality
which prevents the state from promoting or obstructing religious activities is not
necessarily the most effective way to serve this conception of the good.
Philosophers in other time periods and cultures have identified human
interests differently than modern liberals; the notion of human dignity, involving
both material worth and individual identity, is a significant tradition which
requires supporting argument or at least explicit acknowledgement. Neither
Dworkin nor Rawls has presented a self-evident, neutral, universally accepted,
or least intrusive concept of the good life; their chosen methods of promoting the
good life, e.g., Dworkin's defense of pornography and public financing of art,'
are controversial and contradict the values of many. Competing goals for
society, which may be more or less consistent with people's intuitions, include
maximizing general welfare, protecting an absolute right to private property,
protecting differential rights based on a historical caste system, and other ideas
which have been adopted throughout history. Though liberals may be correct in
advancing their good, requiring individuals to abstract from selfish interests and
comprehensive conceptions to frame society's institutions, they must acknowl-
edge their dependence on a transcendental notion of human well-being.
31. Mulhall and Swift, supra note 10, at 114-15.
32. C.P.S. Clarke, Short History of the Christian Church 279-80 (1929).
33. William Pfaff, In a Society of Moral Failure. Extremists Find Room. Int'l.Herald Trib.,
April 2-3. 1994, at 6.
34. Dworkin, supra note 1, at 337-73.
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C. Conclusion
Liberal assumptions concerning rationality and human well-being have not
been criticized for being incorrect, but have been shown to require justification.
Liberals may adopt such notions only by appealing to transcendental truths. The
Western notions of rationality and the sanctity of humanity should not be hidden
behind neutrality, claiming an a priori victory over differing notions, but rather
made explicit so that they can be used forcefully and consistently to confront
competing conceptions.
The problem with liberal neutrality is not that it is used in the defense of the
wrong goods, but rather that it is ineffective at promoting these particular goods.
Critics do not necessarily disagree with the liberal goals of tolerance, universal-
ism, fairness, etc., but rather claim that liberals are trapped in a paradox whereby
they must deny their own goods in order to secure them.35 This denial,
performed in the name of tolerance, undercuts the liberal commitment to the very
goods supposedly motivating the denial.
In addition to being ineffective at promoting liberal goals, e.g., neutrality
itself, neutrality strips liberal goals of their content and thus renders them
incoherent. Though Rawls and other liberals may have correctly identified the
proper locus of concern for a political theory of justice, the least advantaged,
their discussion of the legitimate claims of individuals is meaningless without
reference to an objective good, a comprehensive and particular conception, which
those rights serve. 6 All theories require a good to articulate those intuitions
which society should follow, else they risk reducing intuitions to being no more
morally significant than brute reactions, e.g., nausea. Any conception of the
good is dependent upon a conception of the nature and worth of human
beings." While human nature informs society of how to act justly, human
worth tells it why it must do so, i.e., provides the motivation to accompany the
content.
Liberals, insofar as they are committed to neutrality, fail to justify why they
believe what they believe and instead rely on their readers' residual attachment
to the morality of past codes. The danger is that the farther removed the
individual is from the objective code, the more likely its implications will lose
their binding force. Conditioned in an age of relativism, individuals are unlikely
to sacrifice their perceived interests for the sake of some abstract code which
holds only vague emotional, sentimental value rather than objective, moral force.
Liberals insist on neutrality, but rely on the norms of objective morality in
formulating codes and resolving moral conflicts; they refuse to preach what they
practice, pretending their ethics are the result of choice rather than being
objectively correct.
35. Taylor, supra note 21, at 88.
36. Id. at 89.
37. Mulhal and Swift. supra note 10, at 119-20, 122-23.
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Rousseau notes that contract theories, whose conditions Rawls attempts to
mimic, require the participants to be citizens before the state is created; the morality
being modelled, e.g., the institution of promise-keeping, is already presumed in
order to form a binding contract. Morals, customs, and belief are necessary to
sustain the state.38 Rousseau's provision of these essential components via a
mystical Lawgiver is perhaps more honest than modem liberal theorists who do not
explain how their neutral theories obtain these transcendental values.
D. Beyond Choice
The liberal project of investing each individual with inherent worth is undercut
by its refusal to advance a transcendental notion of the good. Rawls and Dworkin
both recognize this flaw in practice, if not in theory. An absolute respect for self-
determination is not the best means to furthering human flourishing; however,
individual choice can only be overridden by reference to an objective good.
The case of natural disabilities illustrates the inability of choice to fully
capture the concept of human well-being. The challenge for a society wishing
to mitigate the effects of fortune, so that each individual's life is determined by
his decisions, is the impossibility of compensating the handicapped without
unduly restricting the rights of others. The liberal devotion to self-determination
suggests that the child born with genetic defects is as entitled to compensation
as the one injured in an accident due to another's negligence. Yet, counteracting
the disadvantage, especially emotional suffering, associated with many ailments
would require most or of all of society's resources, thus enslaving the healthy. 39
An ordering of human interests, available only to theories with a comprehensive
conception of the good, is necessary to discriminate among claims of disadvan-
tage.
Rawls, acknowledging this dilemma, sets aside the issue of illness. Yet,
since the arbitrary distribution of natural primary goods, e.g., health and
intelligence, motivate him to redistribute society's resources, guaranteeing the
disabled the same income as the healthy, he should also mitigate the effects of
the natural goods themselves, compensating the handicapped for their suffering.
Dworkin handles the potentially overwhelming claims of the disabled by
requiring society to respect collective preferences, rather than providing every
individual with meaningful control over his life. Conceding the impracticality
of fully compensating the handicapped, ' ° Dworkin limits their compensation to
the aggregate premiums reasonable individuals are willing to pay to insure their
welfare if they were to become similarly disadvantaged.
38. Jean.Jacques Rousseau. The Social Contract 213-17, 227-28 (G.D.H. Cole trans. & rev. by
J.H. Brumfitt & John C. Hall, J.M. Dent & Sons Ltd. 1990).
39. Ronald Dworkin, What is Equality? Part !!: Equality of Resources. 10 Phil. & Pub. Aff.
283, 322 (1981).
40. Ronald Dworldn, What is Equality? Part : Equality of Welfare. 10 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 185,
240-44 (1981); Dworkin, supra note 39, at 296-304, 322.
1266 (Vol. 57
BOBBY JINDAL
Dworkin's reliance on society's risk-averseness to determine the compensa-
don owed the disabled is a more honest confrontation of the issue, in contrast
with Rawls' silence, but lacks the force of transcendental rights. The tough
question is what to do with gamblers who find themselves without adequate
welfare provisions. Regret, false consciousness, incomplete information, and
other issues complicate the reasonability of hypothetical consent, but a more
significant critique is that a society simply cannot abandon individuals in need.
The issue of self-inflicted afflictions, e.g., lung cancer, illustrates how
irrational preference formation may result in illiberal consequences. Liberals
must either abandon smokers or their commitment to self-determination. In order
to provide health care to smokers, liberals must either divorce the connection
between actions and consequences or discount choices which contradict a
person's welfare; either limits the concept of choice. Allowing individuals to
choose a cause, but not the effect,4' or ignoring certain choices involves
determining an individual's interests independent of his preferences, i.e., a thick
conception of the good. Respect for individual choice fails to protect the
individual from harming himself, but allowingi society to intervene without an
objective good allows individuals to act on desires, often reflecting self-interest
or prejudice, concerning how others should lead their lives. A just society may
override the liberal good of self-determination in the case of willful cigarette
consumers, and other cases in which fundamental human interests are threatened,
but only by referring to an objective notion of human well-being.
Liberals respect choice too much by allowing individuals, e.g., smokers, to
give away rights that are non-transferrable, but respect choice too little by ignoring
the possibility that individuals, e.g., gamblers, may express regret over earlier
decisions. A just society cannot abandon human beings, regardless of the choices
they make. Liberals wrongly discriminate among individuals, failing to compen-
sate fully the disabled, rather than conceptions of the good. Liberals need not
sacrifice their commitment to equality, but rather to neutrality; an objective
ordering of human interests allows society to frustrate the liberal goal of self-
determination to secure basic rights for all.
The modem liberal notion of rights, predicated on the inherent worth of each
individual, accomplishes much in promoting human well-being, but its refusal to
draw upon objective human interests causes it to fall short of serving this goal fully.
Liberal rights cannot be voided because of efficiency or democratic considerations;
neither utility nor electoral tallies are relevant. However, the fact that rights are
socially derived prevents them from serving as absolute moral trumps. Dworkin
explicitly rejects legal positivism, especially in its utilitarian manifestation, for a
more normative perspective, but fails to ground rights in anything substantive.
Liberals insist that rights not be overridden by popular opinion, but locate
the justification of rights in rational choice; liberal equality, without any
41. This option also limits the autonomy of non-smokers by forcing them to subsidize the
behavior of others.
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additional moral content concerning human well-being, codifies those preferences
expressed when individuals abstract from their particulars.4" Dworkin seeming-
ly recognizes that there must exist rights separate from and prior to political
rights; yet, he never discusses the source or extent of these moral rights.
Defending individuals who break laws in the name of moral rights and arguing
that prosecutors "do the right thing in failing to prosecute them," Dworkin leaves
too much discretion to the individual official; he does not require the official to
enforce the law or provide another objective code. Denying Supreme Court
decisions and laws as having "special" weight and then leaving the discernment
of moral rights to "reasonable men" is a plan for anarchy, not just rule.43
The weak link in Dworkin's theory of rights is his reluctance to protect
explicitly specific interests and freedoms against society's collective preferences.
In contrast, traditional liberal philosophers, including the first proponents of
hypothetical consent, value certain rights as inviolable. For example, Locke
thinks natural rights to be prior to society, thus exerting a special claim on
subsequent political morality. Locke allows citizens to "appeal to God";'a
collective right to rebellion is guaranteed if societal preferences contradict a
group's transcendental rights." Similarly, Rousseau views freedom as an
inviolable and non-transferable right.4 ' Even Dworkin admits, albeit briefly,
that there may exist certain rights that individuals should not be allowed to give
away.' Only the modem notion of neutrality prevents liberals from continuing
in this tradition of forcing society to respect transcendental rights, independent
of reasonable consent. Dworkin's aggregate morality is no substitute for
objective morality; evaluating interests from a transcendental perspective, that of
no one, is not the same as from everyone's perspective.
Dworkin's aversion to ontological claims prevents him from valuing rights
as anything more than a codification of collective preferences.47 He rejects the
claim that "whatever rights people have are at least in part timeless rights
necessary to protect enduring and important interests fixed by human nature...
[e.g.,] the choice of sexual partners and acts and choice of religious convic-
tions.. .""I Either Dworkin is hiding his transcendental principles in his
requirement of reasonable consent or his rights serve as moral trumps over a
utilitarian calculus, but are themselves trumped by society.
This dual commitment to rights as trumps and the product of societal
preferences often renders the liberal notion of rights impotent in particular
42. Aristotle, The Politics 264-69 (T.A. Sinclair trans. & rev. by Trevor J. Saunders, 1981);
Dworkin, supra note 39, at 283-90; Rawls, supra note 15. at 18-19. 244.
43. Ronald Dworkin. Taking Rights Seriously 196-97, 205 (1978).
44. John Locke, The Second Treatise of Government 15, 138-39 (1952).
45. Rousseau, supra note 38, at 182-89.
46. Dworkin, supra note 39. at 295.
47. Dworkin does exclude "external preferences" concerning how others should live. Dworkin,
supra note I. at 194-98; Dworkin, supra note 40, at 201-04.
48. Ronald Dworkin, Rishts as Trumps, in Theories of Rights 164 (Jeremy Waldron ed., 1984).
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situations. Dworkin's rights do not prevent the sacrifice of inviolable interests for
the common good; for example, he does not protect talents, organs, and other
intrinsic aspects of human identity which should not be given or taken away.
Society may implement a "spare organs lottery" to redistribute second kidneys and
other superfluous organs from the healthy to the handicapped; society may require
individuals to sacrifice one eye, and thus partial vision, so that blind individuals
might also have partial vision. 9 Even more drastic would be the killing of a few
individuals to better or save the lives of many handicapped.' Equality, which
merely demands random selection when harvesting organs, cannot stop such brutal
policies. Liberals must pack more content into the concept of equality, including
objective interests which society must respect."' Transcendental rights, e.g., a
privacy right to bodily integrity, must supersede even the terms of hypothetical
consent.
Though better than utilitarian theorists in protecting human interests, liberals
depend on consent to move from procedural or formal to substantive justice,
regardless of the consequences. The lack of content in liberal rights renders them
unable to condemn the most unjust societal arrangements, as long as the require-
ments of hypothetical consent are satisfied. This minimal view of rights, protecting
only the right to define the good, is derived from the desire to be neutral.52
However, rights have no content without considerations of human interests, which
are hardly neutral or uncontroversial. 3 Indeed, Kierkegaard, Kant, Diderot,
Hume, Smith, and other Enlightenment philosophers all agreed that morality must
serve man's objective nature, which gives ethical principles their content.-
Certain liberal theorists recognize the need for a fuller conception of human
flourishing; for example, Rawls' primary goods and George Klosko's presumptive
benefits serve objective human interests. Klosko postulates the existence of certain
goods, e.g., physical security and bodily integrity, which appeal to all people
regardless of their conception of the good life. Given a choice, rational self-
interested individuals accept these goods and the services necessary to secure them,
e.g., national defense and public order."5 Similarly, Rawls identifies primary
goods which reasonable individuals desire to enhance their well-being. 6 Rawls
and Klosko both identify interests common to all of humanity; this objective notion
of human welfare allows the protection of vital interests against competing choices.
49. G.A. Cohen, Are Freedom and Equality Compatible?, in Alternatives to Capitalism 113,
116 (Jon Elster & Karl 0. Moene eds., 1989).
50. Judith Thomson, The Realm of Rights 135 (1990).
51. As a start, Rawls separates transferable resources from natural endowments; Dworkin
distinguishes physical and mental powers from resources. See Rawls, supra note 15, at 62. Dworkin,
supra note 39, at 300-01.
52. Dworkin, supra note 1, at 191-92; Nagel. supra note 6, at 258; Rawls, supra note 15, at
433; Rawls, supra note 9, at 10; Raz, supra note 18, at 160.
53. Raz, supra note 18, at 240.
54. Mulhall and Swift, supra note 10. at 77.
55. George Klosko, The Principle of Fairness and Political Obligation 35-42, 48-57 (1992).
56. Rawls, supra note 15, at 94-95.
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The most fundamental presumptive benefits or primary goods must be
provided by society; objective interests, combined with the notion of human
dignity, invests individuals with rights. Certain liberal writers are beginning to
realize the need to protect welfare rights as more than instrumental in preserving
political rights, e.g., autonomy.57 Indeed, some liberals are even beginning to
discuss political rights as instrumental to articulating and preserving welfare
rights.5" However, lacking an objective notion of human interests, liberals are still
too likely to prioritize the political right to autonomy, interpreted as requiring
neutrality, over other aspects of human well-being which are equally or even more
important.
E. Freedom and Well-Being
Rawls is right to value plurality for its broad appeal to individuals with
differing fundamental commitments, lack of condemnation of unpopular lifestyles,
and limitation of the state's power to promote particular values. Neutrality prevents
an overly ambitious state from interfering in the private spheres of its members'
lives. However, it is nonsensical to require society to infringe on certain rights,
e.g., property claims, without committing to an objective ordering of human
interests; the state can redistribute only by reference to the priority a child's hunger
takes over another's liberty. The resolution lies not in a libertarian protection of all
autonomy interests, but rather in divorcing the connection between anti-perfection-
ism and absolute skepticism towards the good; neutrality, not justice, should be
sacrificed.
Political freedom is only valuable insofar that it advances a valid conception
of the good, rather than being valuable for its Own sake.59 A state respects its
members by treating them according to moral principles rather than merely
providing freedom. Human well-being involves living a life with independent
value, rather than one which one thinks is valuable; freedom is a necessary, but
not sufficient, condition of well-being."'
It is not choice itself, abstracted from human well-being, that is worthwhile,
but rather projects external to the individual and his culture often give life
meaning, e.g., a religious commitment to God.61 Actualized liberty and not
merely the potential to be free should be given priority; being correct is often
more important than having a choice. Indeed, Lord Acton taught that "freedom
is not the power of doing what [one likes], but the right of being able to do what
57. Jeremy Waidron. Liberal Rights 10-11 (1993).
58. Amartya Sen, Freedoms and Needs, The New Republic, Jan. 10 & 17. 1994, at 31-32, 36-
38.
59. Raz, supra note 18, at 4, 417; John Paul II, The Vatican on Veritatis Splendor. 4 This Rock
14. 15 (1993).
60. Raz, supra note 18, at 157, 255.
61. Muihall and Swift, supra note 10, at 293.
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[one] ought. '' Individuals possess limited freedom to choose invalid concep-
tions of the good, but such freedom does not validate mistaken choices. In
contrast, liberals value liberty because it facilitates "self-realization" by allowing
individuals to pursue their own conceptions of the good. 3
The liberal notion that self-realization may have a unique form for each
individual is traditionally linked with freedom from external intervention. Any
fuller conception of liberty requires an evaluation of whether an individual has
properly determined the course of his life. Individuals have conflicting desires
and an imperfect sense of what is in their best interests; suppressing an
individual's stated desires may even serve his welfare. While a fuller conception
of liberty allows individuals to overcome internal obstacles to true freedom, e.g.,
irrational fears or self-deception, and achieve self-realization, liberal liberty
leaves individuals hostage to their "motivational fetters." Admitting the "agent
himself is not the final authority on his own freedom" may be the first step in
insuring true freedom.6'
Allowing an individual's desires to be superseded for his own benefit divides
the individual into "the transcendent, dominant controller, and the empirical
bundle of desires and passions to be disciplined."' 5 Plato first made this
division between man's reasoning and desiring capacity; the former must control
the instant gratification impulses of the latter." Though liberals routinely use
reason to constrain one's selfish interests for the common good, 7 they make no
allowance for this possibility of an individual controlling his desires for his own
good. Original sin motivates man to desire goods contrary to his inherent
purpose; meaningful liberty involves freeing man from such self-destructive
desires rather than respecting them.
Rawls seemingly realizes the necessity of a transcendental good and now
allows justice as fairness to supersede the goal of consensus; he admits his view
of justice is a moral conception and desires public acceptance for support rather
than validity." Thus, Rawls advances his theory not as the result of public
deliberation, but rather as a liberal moral conception which happily coincides
with cultural values." Dworkin even accepts the state's role in promoting a
range of options, his choice of worthy options reflecting a thick conception of
the good. 0 Liberals must be even more forthcoming about the transcendental
nature of their project.
62. George Weigel, Standing Up for Moral Aspiration, Int'l Herald Trib., October 1993, at 5.
63. Taylor, supra note 21, at 176.
64. Id. at 180.
65. Isaiah Berlin. Four Essays on Liberty 134 (1970).
66. Plato, supra note 2, at 280-83.
67. Hobbes, supra note 20, at 110-18, 242; Locke, supra note 44, at 6-8.
68. John Rawls. The Domain of the Political and Overlapping Consensus. 64 N.Y.U. L. Rev.
233, 245-46 (1989).
69. Mulhall and Swift. supra note 10, at 187-95.
70. Dworkin, supra note 1, at 202. 209. 221-33.
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I. COMMUNITARIAN RELATIVISM
Communitarians share the liberal avoidance of a transcendental good, but
rely on group rather than individual preferences. The communitarian notion of
human well-being includes interests which can be provided only through
community and prior to individual choice; in contrast, Rawls presumes that the
self is complete before social cooperation.7 Though Rawls claims his
conception of the person is political and not metaphysical, a mental construct and
not a truth claini,2 its central role in his theory may preclude such a distinction.
The liberal commitment to self-determination is what allows, if not motivates,
Rawls to be neutral regarding the good; his belief that individuals can know their
political interests without reference to their relationships leads Rawls to affirm
each individual's freedom to choose his own good. Communitarians are right to
criticize the liberal obsession with self-determination, but do not go far enough.
Communitarians disagree with liberalism's assertion of the primacy of
justice, without reference to the goods being distributed, and the fullness of the
individual before his ends.73 They deny that it is possible, much less construc-
tive, to abstract an individual from his relationships and projects, i.e., social
context, and still maintain a meaningful notion of the person. Certain ends are
crucial to the self's identity, and some of these ends can be known only through
the common good.74 In contrast with the liberal combination of individual
preferences into the common good, communitarians use the common good to
judge individual preferences. 75
Rousseau takes the communitarian emphasis on the common good to its
extreme conclusion. Individuals become indivisible parts of the collective entity;
dissenting opinions do not truly reflect what the individual desires. Even if
external force is required, the private interest must be sacrificed for the general
will.76 Whereas Rousseau and Rawls both recognize that society must treat
individuals equally, Rawls chooses plurality, requiring the state to promote
divergent conceptions of the good," and Rousseau requires the state to ignore
private interests. Rather than requiring the state to support the expression of
individual interests, Rousseau views such interests as detrimental to the vitality
of the state.7
Though liberal individualism may appear to be at odds with communitarian
collectivism, Rawls' view of autonomy is delimited by significant communal
71. Rawls, supra note 15, at 127, 560.
72. Rawls, supra note 5, at 245.
73. Mulhall and Swift, supra note 10, at 42-43.
74. Michael J. Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice 55-59, 152-54. 183 (1982).
75. Kymlicka, supra note 7, at 206-07; Rousseau, supra note 38. at 201-02.
76. Rousseau, supra note 38. at 193-95, 203-08, 213-19, 276-79.
77. All activities unavailable to the individual acting alone and requiring societal support (for
example, forming a family) are not necessarily included.
78. Rousseau, supra note 38, at 265-68.
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restrictions. Rawls claims that talents do not belong to the individual, but rather
to society." His assumption that individuals own nothing more than a claim
on others represents a conception of the self as inherently linked with other
members of society.' 0 Thus, Rawls' derivation of his principles of justice,
dependent on the preferences of individuals abstracted from their interests, entails
each individual discovering rather than choosing ties to fellow members of his
political community."
Despite the liberal claim to universalism, a supposed benefit of neutrality,
both Dworkin and Rawls actually rely on communitarian justifications. While
Dworkin appeals to intuitions already held by his reader, Rawls limits his
theoretical speculation to liberal Western democracies that have supposedly
already accepted his premises. Rawls states that his conception of justice does
not rest on "claims to universal truth, or claims about the essential nature and
identity of persons."' 2 Rawls denies that any comprehensive moral conception
can provide a "publicly recognized basis for a conception of justice" in a modern
democratic state and instead draws his first principles from those intuitions
already contained in political traditions.' 3 The fact that liberals refuse to posit
universally applicable or correct principles reduces their positions to a communi-
taiian dependence on empirical data concerning a particular society's existing
beliefs.
Communitarians make their denial of a transcendental good an essential part
of their theories. For example, Michael Walzer claims that the appropriate
distribution of any good depends on its social meaning; indeed, he allows only
internal criticism, faulting a society for not acting consistently, but not arguing
with society's basic principles." Recognizing the appeal of universality,
Walzer claims dominant ideologies make transcendental claims to appear
convincing, but actually advance particular interests behind these "universalist
disguises";" similarly, Rorty claims objective truth claims are motivated by the
individual's desire to have his ideas dominate, rather than by metaphysical
arguments.' Thus, communitarians locate ethical principles in society's
attitudes rather than abstracting from particular interests.
Communitarians reject any transcendental moral code and claim morality is
a social construct. The only principles advanced as transcendental are:
1. people's collective preferences should guide society
2. there are no other universal principles.
79. Rawls, supra note 15, at 101.
80. Mulhall and Swift. supra note 10, at 63.
81. Sandel, supra note 74, at 132.
82. Rawls, supra note 5, at 223-25.
83. Id
84. Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice 8-9, 312-13 (1983).
85. Michael Walzer, Interpretation and Social Criticism 41 (1987).
86. Rorty, supra note I1, at 193.
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The liberal transcendental principle appears partially self-refuting. It is
incoherent to claim, "I know that I know nothing"; the act of knowing that one
is ignorant credits one with knowledge. 7 The less radical communitarian claim
that "there are no other objective truths" admits that transcendental truth exists,
raises the question of how such truth is known, and gives cause for searching for
other maxims. The communitarian claim that only people's collective preferenc-
es should guide society involves assumptions about human well-being and the
existence of other universal truths. Rather than arguing over the existence of
transcendental principles, it remains to be seen whether communitarianism is the
appropriate transcendental principle by which to order society.
A. Intersocietal Judgments
The first problem with a relativist approach to morality is that, even
assuming a society's members agree on a set of moral laws, it does not allow for
intersocietal comparisons. Perhaps the most tragic aspect of relativism's failure
to address intersocietal comparisons is the lack of guidance just societies can
provide others. Rawls limits his discussion to modem constitutional democra-
cies; despite the flaws of such societies, others are in far greater need of his
principles. Fellow liberal Rorty, who is much more openly communitarian,
admits the impossibility of even discussing topics with others; the lack of a
transcendental common ground prevents a liberal democrat from discussing,
much less assessing, the views of a fascist, communist, etc. The nature of
subjective morality is that it is entirely dependent on one's experience and cannot
be transmitted to others. Neither acceptance nor condemnation of another society
is allowed according to such a society-specific view of morality.
Communitarianism's equation of society's preferences with moral principles
provides no objective criteria by which one can condemn particular actions or
beliefs. Indeed, relativists tend to concern themselves with "inner judgments,"
deciding whether an individual ought to act in a certain way, given his beliefs,
and some do not even discuss "outer judgments," determining whether certain
beliefs are better, evil, or unjust.8 9 Yet, despite their rhetoric concerning man's
inability to judge the beliefs of others, many multiculturalists reserve the right
to condemn genocide, female circumcision, and other practices condoned in
specific societies.
Communitarians may appeal to their concern for group autonomy, without
sacrificing their relativism, to resolve cases like Bosnia, in which a majority
denies an identifiable cultural group the right to order their lives according to
their principles; such cases involve the domination of another culture or nation
by a stronger one. Walzer's claim that people are equally worthwhile due to
87. John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights 74-75 (1988).
88. Rorty, supra note 11, at 190.
89. Gilbert Harman, Moral Relativism Defended, 84 The Phil. Rev. 3, 4-5 (1975).
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their ability to create culture may result in a universal principle that societies
may intervene to prevent other societies from suppressing this capacity.9° Thus,
communitarians can condemn imperialistic moral codes, e.g., "white man's
burden" or "manifest destiny," which override a group's claim to self-definition.
A more difficult dilemma for the relativist is the situation of slavery in
which the oppressed have been trained to expect and accept subordination, e.g.,
Untouchables in India's caste system. In contrast with the case of Nazi
Germany, in which the communitarian can appeal to the autonomy rights of the
Jewish people, he must choose between paternalistic intervention and slavery.
However, relativism seemingly denies the possitiility of identifying an individu-
al's interests independent of his preferences; a communitarian cannot argue the
slave is being duped, since such a judgment depends upon an objective notion
of his interests. Though some institutions of slavery may contradict other
principles inherent in particular societies or some slaves may realize the
unjustness of their predicaments, surely, the communitarian does not expect the
external observer to refrain from making value judgments concerning other
situations.
The ethical individual's distaste for slavery, whether in his society or in
another, is morally more significant than his preference for vanilla ice cream;
communitarianism allows no room for such a distinction between moral
preferences, based on an objective code, and subjective tastes. It is nonsensical
to condemn the injustices of slavery or genocide and justify paternalistic
intervention without basing one's arguments on universal human rights, the
inherent value of human life, and the natural preference for liberty.9' No
rational individual acts as if all moral judgments of others are equally valid; yet,
evaluating the actions of others requires an objective standard.
The inability of relativism to facilitate intersocietal interactions is a
shortcoming if one grants that morality must be functional. Claiming that moral
issues are essentially contestable is both frustrating and alien to the human
condition. Experience shows that contradicting moral codes develop; many wars
stand as testimony to the conflicts between different societies and their beliefs.
Something further must be offered unless one admits that no code is better than
another, leaving violence as the only way to settle disputes.
Many relativists condemn imperialism and other attributes of particular
societies, motivated by the same tolerance which first led them to relativism. It
would be self-defeating for relativism, a theory based on tolerance, to be unable
to condemn racism, sexism, or other intolerant acts merely because they are
committed in a particular geographical location. Indeed, even Walzer concedes
that universal morality, based on a natural law that is not necessarily accepted
or understood by the actors, allows a society to intercede in the affairs of another
90. Walzer, supra note 84, at 314; Mulhall and Swift. supra note 10. at 145.
91. See, e.g.. Aristotle. supra note 42, at 70-75. 430-36, for a defense of slavery.
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on rare occasions to prevent gross atrocities such as human sacrifice.9" Without
a transcendental code, one is forced to abdicate any responsibility to advise,
guide, or judge the policies of another society, whether separated by time or
geography.
B. Intrasocietal Judgments
More troubling than the dilemma of intersocietal judgments is relativism's
inability to resolve intrasocietal tensions. Claiming that societal preferences form
the justification for morality merely enshrines the status quo and prevents
meaningful change. Many societies desire horrible things, and the minority must
have the right of appealing to some external morality to criticize the majority.
For example, the mere fact that a majority, perhaps even an overwhelming
majority, of the citizens of a country desire to enslave a portion of the population
to increase the overall welfare does not give this state of slavery moral force.
Communitarians are forced to start with a community's given beliefs and leave
little room for the ethical individual opposing an unjust society; the act of
choosing among competing principles is pointless without reference to an
objective moral code.
The very tolerance which makes relativism so attractive is self-defeating in
practice. Communitarians forfeit the right to claim particular choices are morally
praiseworthy; moral relativism renders an evaluation of whether society's laws
are just nonsensical. However, a minority dissenting group is not necessarily
morally incorrect.93 Examples of praiseworthy leaders of protest groups include
Mahatma Gandhi, Martin Luther King, and others that protested against and
transformed their respective societies. The causes of history's social reformers
did not become just upon approval of the majority, but rather were correct in
spite of the rejection of the general population; civil disobedience can be
legitimate independent of the latent convictions of the majority."
The lack of a suprasocietal moral code prevents relativists from appealing
to external reality to reform or assess a given society. Whereas a relativist
cannot abstract from society to evaluate that society's actions, such detachment
is often necessary to condemn the evils performed out of majoritarian self-
interest or prejudice. History has taught that mankind can be horribly cruel and
at the same time consistent. "Might makes right" is hardly satisfying when
individuals like Hitler, Stalin, etc. have obtained so much power.
Relativists conflate the perpetuation with the creation of morality, giving
credit to society for both when it does only the former. Noting the transmission
of morals via societal influence is merely a descriptive, not a causal, statement;
92. Walzer, supra note 84, at 45.
93. Merely claiming the subgroup is a distinct society transfers the problem to an intersocietal
one and divides society into fragmented subgroups until only individuals remain.
94. In contrast, see Dworkin, supra note 43, at 184-205.
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one may observe societal influence on morality without concluding that it serves
as justification. Though the relativist goes too far in claiming that morality is
determined, not merely influenced, by societal pressures, he makes a valuable
contribution by observing that political institutions influence the formation of
individually held values. Noting this influence raises the issue of which
principles should form society.
C. The Rise of Moral Relativism
Relativism has gained popular support due to the appeal of tolerance, the need
to process the modern age's rapid pace of change, and the individual's frequent
exposure to foreign cultures; however, none of the phenomena justifies relativism's
influence on morality. A proper understanding of tolerance, change, and diversity
leads to an objective moral code. While critiquing relativism's influence in the
realm of morality, it is useful to understand why relativism has become so popular.
First, the desire for tolerance often results in moral relativism. After many
turbulent periods of changing prejudices, people tired of the condemning attitude
that seemed so intrinsically tied with objective views of morality. If one correct
moral code existed, it seemed only natural to impose this code on all so that
everyone could lead morally correct lives. Historical events like the Inquisition
remind communitarians of the danger of absolutism and provide strong data for
arguments in favor of multiculturalism.
Second, the rapid pace of change has produced further support for relativism.
Never before has change, in the political, scientific, and other spheres, occurred so
quickly. Only fifty years ago, sending a man to the moon was beyond people's
wildest imaginations, much less expectations. Rapid change, with each year's
progress being made obsolete during the very next, weakens people's trust in
authority and eternal truths. Furthermore, modern technology transforms
yesterday's miracles into commonplace events. For example, video and audio
equipment can be used to create illusions which disrupt the simple relationship
between reality and man's senses; seeing is no longer believing. The increasingly
complex and changing world replaces man's confidence in himself to understand
and control his environment with doubt and leads to skepticism towards claims of
universal truths.
Third, accessibility to foreign lands, due to the ease of modem travel,
encourages relativism. The existence of others different from one threatens
heretofore unchallenged faith in the correctness of one's views. The fact that others
differ from the subject in ways that did not even seem possible leads the subject to
conclude that none of his views is valid for others. At the same time, a small
insecure group clings to the firm voice of permanence and confident authority,
without making allowances for change and growth. These ultraconservatives
destroy any credibility that tradition might have.
Though the desire for tolerance, the contingency of truth caused by continuous
discoveries, and the contextualization of one's experience may seem like good
reasons to adopt a relativist view of the world, a better understanding of these
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phenomena actually suggests an objective moral code. First, the good of tolerance
has been perverted by the multicultural agenda; the absolute valuing of tolerance
over integrity is a self-defeating proposition. Interactions between dissenters within
society and between different societies are not facilitated by supposedly tolerant
multiculturalism; for example, communitarianism offers little meaningful
protection for individuals suffering under a dominant culture, e.g., Christians in
Iran. An aversion to judging the actions of others prevents communitarians from
condemning evil rulers who command popular support; merely assessing those
actions which affect the culture rights of an identifiable society is not enough to
express the appropriate moral outrage over the many atrocities they commit against
their own people.
Moral relativism is often advanced in the name of tolerance and diversity;
however, its lack of objective protection for the weak and dependence on society
for morality often leads to intolerant and monolithic conclusions.95 All moral
codes rely on objective assumptions, e.g., the importance of human beings and their
preferences, to provide a solid foundation. Objective morality, which transcends
the particulars of any given situation or society, allows the minority to criticize
atrocities and also coincides with the manner in which most people resolve moral
conflicts. Pluralism itself depends on an objective valuation of autonomy; the
tolerance of relativism is incomplete without the protection of objectivism.
Second, despite the rapid pace of change, certain basics remain constant. It is
a mistake to focus only on the many superficialities, which, despite their appear-
ance of importance due to their large number and frequent contact with one's daily
life, do not constitute the greater part of reality, Fundamentals, e.g., the infinite
worth of man and the rules of logic, remain constant and rise above the specifics
of any place or time. Despite new subatomic particles discovered by physicists and
genetic information decoded by biologists, scientists use the same laws of inference
used many centuries ago by Aristotle, Plato, and other early Western political
theorists.
Third, despite the variability between different cultures, certain moral
principles apply across national and chronological demarcations. An objective truth
may have particular applications which vary according to locale. One example of
a belief being translated into superficially different practices is the right to political
participation requiring a free press in literate societies and alternative means of
communication in others. Thus, diversity does not necessarily contradict objective
and universal underlying principles.
In summary, though the rise of relativism is an understandable response to
recent events, objectivism provides an alternative approach to tolerance, change,
and diversity. Despite the popular reaction, none of the three phenomena argues
decisively in favor of relativism. Indeed, objectivism is better equipped to resolve
the issues raised by the modem age.
95. John Paul I1, Veritatis Splendor 143-47 (1993).
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D. Moral Relativism Versus Objectivism
Whereas objectivists believe that moral intuitions are unlike other reactions
in that they can be questioned and examined with reason,% relativists reduce
moral intuitions to subjective preferences with no value independent of the
subject. Objectivists, thus, link truth with an external reality; intuitions are
instinctive reactions to external objects whose properties exist independent of
man's response." Relativists deny both the possibility of making truth claims
and a link between intuitions and independently existing properties." Relativ-
ists view politics as the study of societal arrangements particular to a historical
context, the study of politics is presented as an empirical investigation of man's
experience, not a search for the right answer."
Relativists do not understand the purpose and function of morality. Their
conception of morality as a summary of society's preferences does not
differentiate morality from rules of etiquette, customs, and other evolving
traditions. Surely, morality must contain some stronger motivating force if it is
to serve any function other than mere window dressing giving society the
appearance of legitimacy. The claim that morality is an artificial construct
perpetuated solely to advance or represent society's interests contains two
fundamental flaws.
First, such a weakened form of morality never motivates individuals to act
against their interests; morality would lose when conflicting with expediency.
Any rational individual, enlightened enough to realize that morality is a social
construct, could act as a "free rider." There is no incentive for any given
individual to refrain from stealing or committing other selfish acts. The
argument that society cannot function if everyone steals makes no sense at the
margin; the individual knows he can steal without causing the entire system to
self-destruct. Thus, only the risk of getting caught prevents the consistent
relativist from stealing or acting in any other selfish manner. There is no reason
to care for others, including loved ones and future generations, except for the
feeling of pleasure generated by such feelings; true selflessness is rendered
nonsensical.
Benevolence, charity, and goodwill have no ethical value in a relativist
framework and may be dismissed as social constructs designed to force the
individual to conform to society's expectations. However, people refrain from
selfish behavior for reasons more complex than the chance of being caught. All
feelings of guilt are not products of social training; people possess an innate
sense of right and wrong. People also care for others and engage in true
altruism, for reasons more noble than self-gratification. It is the height of
96. Mulhall and Swift, supra note 10. at 102.03.
97. Taylor, supra note 21, at 8.
98. John McDowell, Values and Secondary Qualities. in Morality and Objectivity 111-14 (Ted
Honderich ed.. 1985).
99. Aristotle, supra note 42. at 4-6, 154-56.
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arrogance to assert that such individuals, the vast majority of the population, are
simply not rational enough to discern that they are being duped. Without
claiming that all individuals are fully consciously self-reflecting beings, it is
possible to maintain that individuals act with free will to follow an objective
morality. Such a view of morality as larger than man's material existence is
necessary to ground principles of justice which require personal sacrifice.' °°
The second fundamental flaw with the relativist's view is that much of
morality does not coincide with society's material interests. Plato, and later
Marx, considered the relativist critique that states utilize the rhetoric of political
theory to legitimize and advance the interests of the stronger members of
society.'0 ' However, the empirical evidence shows that morality often causes
inefficiencies in the daily workings of society; the very purpose of moral codes
is to counter other forces in society, such as the drive for efficiency, which
threaten transcendental goods, like the inherent dignity of human life. Though
most realize the inefficiency of morality is the necessary cost of protecting
human dignity, theories without transcendental notions of human worth can easily
adopt a Machiavellian view of individuals as citizens to be used for the good of
the state, rather than using the state for the person. 0 2
Though one may explain the need for honesty and the Protestant work ethic
in terms of economic production, it is not so obvious what material justifications
can be found for protection of the weak, the basic value of all human life,
especially the aged and the disabled, and other seemingly unproductive tenets of
all mainstream religious faiths and most moral codes. The argument that
preservation of life is necessary to give society stability certainly does not
explain why no moral code advocates eugenics, concentration of resources on the
productive, and killing the disabled. Certainly, efficiency would dictate that one
life be sacrificed to provide organs to save the lives of ten others. However,
objective suprasocietal notions like bodily integrity, human rights, and basic
human dignity trump such utilitarian considerations.
Relativism, thus, fails to explain both the motivational power and content of
morality. Unlike relativism, which leaves man hostage to his preferences,
objectivism allows the individual to step back and evaluate his intuitions against
an external standard. It is possible for individuals to possess the wrong
conception of the good life, thus requiring them to either repress or alter
particular intuitions for the sake of moral growth. 3 The existence of an
objective criteria of moral goodness, independent of man's preferences, allows
objectivists to explain how individuals and societies improve themselves, a
phenomenon left unexplained in the relativist account of political morality.
100. Abraham H. Maslow, Toward a Psychology of Being iv (2d ed. 1968).
101. Plato, supra note 2, at 35-36. 1 Karl Marx, Capital: A Critical Analysis of Capitalist
Production 20, 24-25, 257-58, 270-72, 341-42, 576-77, 605-06, 689-93 (1987).
102. Rousseau, supra note 38, at 298-308.
103. Mulhall and Swift, supra note 10, at 103-05.
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III. CONCLUSION
Relativism is incapable of resolving the moral dilemmas which commonly
confront individuals and societies; both liberalism and communitarianism have
been shown to depend instead on transcendental principles. As theories which
reject transcendentalism fail at providing effective conceptions of justice,
transcendental principles are an unavoidable and necessary aspect of the political
discourse. The diversity of first principles, e.g., priority of liberty rights versus
welfare rights, cultural relativism versus objective reality, etc., may prevent
universal agreement, but one must make explicit such transcendental assump-
tions.
Communitarians are right in asserting the existence of certain goods which
an individual cannot choose. Certain goods, and perhaps even an appreciation
for the good life, can only be provided in a social context. For example,
particular religious communities practice infant baptism and circumcision before
the child has the ability to discern his religious faith; communitarians are correct
in asserting the value of raising children according to particular values and
beliefs, perhaps necessary to process future experiences, even before they reach
the age of reason. Liberals are wrong in emphasizing choice as a necessary
component of all goods; indeed, some of the most vital goods, e.g., good parents,
innate skills, etc., cannot be chosen. Yet, while communitarians are right in
criticizing Rawls for believing that individuals are capable of abstracting from
their fundamental commitments, they do not go far enough by asserting these
commitments are formed by society alone; many fundamental human interests
are inherent to human nature. Certain objective and universal interests transcend
both individual and societal choice and are common to all individuals by virtue
of their being human.
Human well-being cannot be defined merely in terms of subjective interests;
an objective notion of man's purpose is necessary to move from statements of
fact to prescription, moving from "is" to "ought." Though Rawls makes a
Machiavellian move to divide personal from political interests, Hobbes, Aristotle,
and other political philosophers have viewed politics as a continuation of the
study of man's moral and physical well-being. The preservation and advance-
ment of human welfare, in its entirety rather than a thinner political conception,
must be the foundational goal of a just society.
The invocation of transcendental assumptions, necessary to formulate an
adequate notion of human well-being, suggests both the existence and discerni-
bility of an objective set of truths. The subject recognizes, rather than creates,
the value and force of political principles. The limitations of humanity do not
limit matter, creation, and ultimately truth; such a view exaggerates the
importance of human beings and belittles reality. Every question has a definite
answer, but that answer may not be known or even knowable.
Though man may never fully comprehend all of reality, intuitions, observa-
tions, and reasoning allow individuals to grasp partial truths and the implications
of fuller truths. Partial truths, involving the rejection of competing claims
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without fully accepting an alternative as comprehensively accurate, may be the
best man can achieve. Often, it is easier to reject falsehoods than to do the
reverse and accept complete truths. Thus, a theory of justice must be built on
a foundation of partial truths; man's evolving understanding of the world will
necessarily lead to modifications in his conception of justice.
It may be argued, as it has been in the past, that transcendental morality has no
place in the political sphere. Indeed, an English politician remarked that "humanity
is a private feeling, not a public principle to act upon." The official was objecting
to the use of inherent dignity arguments to oppose the slave trade in nineteenth-
century England."° Yet, natural rights have been at the forefront of every major
political and social change, whether the abolition of slavery, the outlawing of child
labor, the establishment of a minimum wage, the advancement of women's rights,
etc. The Declaration of Independence, which established the United States as a
nation, talks of man as being created and endowed with inalienable rights. Whether
derived in a humanist or a religious context, man's rights and his inherent dignity
have long been a part of the political process, and it would be difficult, if not
impossible, to defend much of modern social legislation without such notions.
Historians can testify to the role that belief in natural law and ordering has
played in legitimizing government. Sociologist Daniel Bell argues that "the
ultimate support for any social system is the acceptance by the population of a
moral justification of authority."' 05 Rulers are provided with "just and reason-
able" standards, and the ruled are "bound to respect and obey those given charge
over them."'10 Indeed, Napoleon claimed, "[r]eligion is what keeps the poor from
murdering the rich."' ' He might have added that it also keeps the rich from
murdering the poor. Brazilian death squads, policemen hired by middle-class
merchants to protect their inventories, murder homeless children who are likely
shoplifters. Such horrific actions are implicitly condoned in any society which does
not explicitly recognize the transcendental worth of each individual and his inherent
dignity. It is impossible to reconcile one's liberty with the justice that another must
have something to eat if it is not clear where the right to liberty or justice originates.
An honest theory of justice makes explicit its transcendental assumptions,
though it must refrain from asserting any claim to comprehensive knowledge of
objective truth. Despite liberal protestations to the contrary, all theories depend
upon transcendental claims. Whereas communitarianism has been shown to
promote the wrong transcendental good, liberalism may defend the right goods for
the wrong reasons. Man's inherent nature and dignity serve as the foundation for
a fuller universal moral code, a collection of values external to the individual,
which includes principles of justice.
104. Charles Colson, Kingdoms in Conflict 149 (1987) (quoting the Earl of Abingdon).
105. Colson, supra note 104, at 326 (quoting Daniel Bell, The Cultural Contradictions of
Capitalism 77 (1978)).
106. Colson, supra note 104, at 276.
107. Colson, supra note 104, at 276, quoted in Robert Byrne, The Other 637 Best Things
Anybody Ever Said 6 (1984).
(Vol. 571282
